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NOTES 
RESTRAINT OF TRADE-Trading Stamps-The Federal 
Trade Commission and the Green Stamp: 
The Effect upon Competition of Restrictions 
on Distribution and Redemption of 
Trading Stamps 
Sperry and Hutchinson Company (S & H), the largest trading 
stamp company in the United States, has maintained two policies 
throughout its seventy-two years of business. The one-for-ten policy 
requires retailers licensed by S & H to issue stamps to consumers at 
the rate of one stamp for every ten cents worth of merchandise pur-
chased. The intent of this policy is to prevent retailers from engaging 
in "multiple stamping"-the practice of giving more than one stamp 
for every ten-cent purchase. This restricted rate of issuance is main-
tained through contractual agreements between the stamp company 
and its licensees. The second policy that the company has pursued 
has as its goal preventing redemption of S & H stamps at any place 
other than S & H "redemption centers." This effort is directed pri-
marily at the independent trading stamp exchanges and independent 
retail outlets which redeem various kinds of stamps. Acting alone 
and with other stamp companies, S & H has effectively suppressed 
such redemption activity with litigation and threats of legal action. 
As might be expected, all of these practices generated a good deal 
of litigation,1 most of it initiated by S & H or its licensees asserting 
that the restrictions should be enforced. However, in Sperry & 
Hutchinson Co.2 the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) recently 
challenged both policies under section 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act.3 
The FTC complaint had three parts: (1) that the one-for-ten 
restrictions were an illegal restraint of trade; (2) that S & H had 
conspired with others to enforce the one-for-ten policy; and, (3) that 
S & H, alone or in combination with others, deliberately attempted 
to restrain free and open redemption of trading stamps. The Com-
mission's hearing examiner found some changes proved and others 
unproved, and both parties appealed. The FTC found that all three 
counts of the complaint had been sustained; with regard to the S & H 
policies that were challenged, it found that both the one-for-ten 
restrictions on stamp issuance and the suppression of stamp redemp-
tion were unfair trade practices within the meaning of section 5 of 
the Federal Trade Commission Act.4 
I. See notes Zl, 34-35 infra and accompanying text. 
2. Sperry &: Hutchinson Co., 3 CCH 1968 TRADE R.Ec. REP. ,I 18,449 Gune 26, 1968) 
[hereinafter principal case]. 
3. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(l) (1964) which reads: "Unfair methods of competition in com-
merce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are declared unlawful." 
4. Principal case at 20,785, 20,791. 
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S & H argued that the company's actions with regard to the one-
for-ten policy were motivated by legitimate business purposes. 5 The 
Commission stated that, even assuming the existence of legitimate 
business purposes, the company's actions must still be judged by 
their effect upon competition. The FTC concluded that the one-for-
ten policy did result in a substantial impairment of competition, but 
it did not clarify exactly how competition had been impaired.6 To 
understand fully how competition is affected by the one-for-ten 
policy, it is first necessary to discover how multiple stamping is used 
as a means of competition. 
If retailers use multiple stamping to intensify their competitive 
efforts-that is, by engaging in this practice without eliminating or 
cutting down on any of their existing competitive activity-the 
obvious result is an increase in total competitive activity. If a retail 
competitor will lower prices and give extra stamps, or if he will use 
stamps where price competition is not a practical alternative, the 
S & H restraint of multiple stamping clearly results in a lessening of 
competition. However, multiple stamping may be employed simply 
as a substitute for another method of competition. If a retail com-
petitor will either lower prices or give extra stamps to make his 
product more desirable, the one-for-ten policy does not result in a 
lessening of total competitive activity; rather, it simply channels 
competition into other forms.7 A third possibility is that the use of 
multiple stamping may tend to reduce competition. Retailers who 
engage in multiple stamping may be able to compete effectively with 
each other without giving the consumer the same benefits in terms 
of cost and product quality which would result from price competi-
5. S &: H claimed its purposes were (1) to select a rate of issuance that would be 
both attractive to the consumer and profitable to the retailer; (2) to aid licensees in 
budgeting their costs; (3) to provide a uniform rate of issuance so that the public 
would know what to expect at an S &: H store; and, (4) to avoid the injury to its 
licensees that would occur if one of the group dispenses more than one stamp for each 
ten-cent purchase. Principal case at 20,778. 
6. The FTC held that the S &: H one-for-ten policy, "by limiting retailers' oppor-
tunities to compete, has substantially impaired or may substantially impair competi-
tion." Principal case at 20,783. At another point, the Commission indicated that it 
was seeking to preserve stamp competition against limitations and restraints. Finally, 
it was stated that S &: H had "engaged in a practice restraining trade in much the 
same way as if it had entered into agreements with such dealers bearing specifically 
on the prices of the products they sold." Principal case at 20,783-84. These statements 
could be interpreted to mean that the impairment of competition by S &: H consisted 
of any of the following: restraining retailer stamp competition; restraining over-all 
retailer competition by eliminating a competitive tool; or restraining the retailer's 
opportunity to choose his method of competition. The first-restraining stamp com-
petition-would be nonsensical since retailers do not compete in the sale or giving 
of stamps, but use them only to compete in the sale of other items. 
7. Usually, this channelling would lead to price competition. The FTC set forth 
a great deal of testimony and evidence to the effect that price and stamp competition 
were effective responses to each other. Principal case at 20,779-82. Of course, without the 
option of engaging in stamp competition, a retailer could engage in various other forms 
of nonprice competition. 
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tion.8 In such a situation, the one-for-ten policy would increase com-
petition by eliminating the use of an economically undesirable sub-
stitute for price competition. 
Thus, the effect on competition of the one-for-ten policy depends 
upon whether the use of multiple stamping creates additional com-
petition, simply results in the same amount of competitive activity in 
a different form, or tends to reduce competition between retailers. It 
is clear that only if the first effect is present will the restrictions im-
posed by the one-for-ten policy lessen or impair competition. The 
Commission, however, did not offer any evidence to show that 
multiple stamping by retailers leads to an increase in total competi-
tive activity. Thus, there is nothing to support the conclusion that 
S & H's restrictions on multiple stamping impaired competition.9 
Moreover, the FTC seemed to view multiple stamping as a substi-
tute for price competition-a view that would presumably lead to 
the conclusion that competitive activity had not been lessened.10 
However, though the Commission failed to show that the one-
for-ten policy actually lessened competition, its conclusion that the 
S & H policy is an unfair trade practice may be justified on other 
grounds. First, the FTC obviously cannot allow every method of 
competition to be restrained on the rationale that only the form of 
competitive activity-not its total level-will be affected by particu-
lar challenged restrictions. Thus, the Commission can either judge 
among the various competitive tools, choosing which may be re-
strained and which must be left free, or it can protect the use of all 
legitimate means of competition, trusting to the individual trader to 
8. This might occur because of an economically irrational consumer preference for 
trading stamps rather than cost reductions or quality improvements. It is certainly 
true that, in general, consumers seem to like stamps. The FTC opinion indicates the 
rapid growth of stamp companies in general and S &: H in particular, especially after 
1955. Principal case at 20,773-75, 20,775 graph a:444. However, the fact that trading 
stamps and game plans have been a target of consumer boycotts-the housewives' 
strikes of supermarkets-indicates that there is some awareness of the realities of the 
competitive tradeoff. Moreover, some large supermarkets now advertise the fact that 
they do not give stamps, stating that their prices therefore are lower. 
9. The only evidence concerning the comparative efficiency of price and stamp 
distribution as competitive tools was the testimony of one witness who stated that 
stamps are a more effective form of competition than price in those markets where 
price cuts are subject to rapid neutralization through imitation. Principal case at 
20,781. In such situations, the adoption of a stamp plan is more effective because it 
is not quickly or easily imitated. This testimony, however, does not show that multiple 
stamping is a superior form of competition in these markets; unlike securing a stamp 
plan, multiple stamping is as easily imitated as price cuts once the retailer has stamps 
to distribute. 
10. The following statement summarizing the Commission's discussion of the one-
for-ten policy is indicative of the FTC view: 
On the desirability of the use of stamp competition in place of price competition 
we make no finding either way; we can only recognize, looking at the record before 
us, that such competition does exist; that it is substantial; that, in some circum-
stances, it is worth preserving against limitations and restraints. 
Principal case at 20,783. 
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determine which is the preferable competitive tool for his purposes. 
By choosing the latter approach, the FTC would avoid the necessity 
of making difficult-if not impossible-decisions about the relative 
value of various methods of competition. A related consideration is 
that, by outlawing S & H's restrictions on the distribution of stamps, 
the FTC decision protects the freedom of the individual trader to 
make an independent business judgment concerning his choice of 
competitive tools. It is submitted that preserving the trader's right 
to compete in his own way is, in and of itself, a goal that is within 
the intent of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act as it 
has been interpreted.. 
In assessing both of the challenged practices, the FTC disclaimed 
any interest in formulating a broad rule of per se illegality.11 Instead, 
it relied heavily on the particular facts and stated that it could find 
a violation of section 5 "without a showing of such anticompetitive 
effects as would be required under the antitrust laws."12 The Com-
mission was of course relying on the Supreme Court cases indicating 
that conduct can be an unfair method of competition under section 
5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act without also being an anti-
trust violation.13 In Federal Trade Commission v. Brown Shoe Co.,14 
the Court set out a broad standard for judging FTC action under 
section 5: "the broad power of the Commission is particularly well 
established with regard to trade practices which conflict with the 
basic policies of the Sherman and Clayton Acts even though such 
practices may not actually violate these laws."15 
In recent years the Supreme Court has indicated that it is part 
of the policy of the Sherman Act to protect the freedom of the 
individual trader to compete. In Keifer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & 
Sons, Inc.,16 defendant manufacturers were charged with fixing maxi-
mum wholesale prices. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
held that defendants had not violated the Sherman Act because their 
actions tended to promote rather than restrain competition. The 
Supreme Court reversed, holding that agreements to fix maximum 
prices, just as those to fix minimum prices, "cripple the freedom of 
traders and thereby restrain their ability to sell in accordance with 
their own judgment."17 Although the price-fixing agreements may in 
11. Principal case at 20,777 (one-for-ten policy), 20,790 (suppression of "unauthorized" 
redemption). 
12. Principal case at 20,779. 
13. The Supreme Court stated in Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357, 369 
(1965), "It has been long recognized that there are many unfair methods of competition 
that do not assume the proportions of antitrust violations." See also FTC v. Brown 
Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 321 (1966); FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 694 (1948). 
14. 384 U.S. 316 (1966). 
15. 384 U.S. at 321. 
16. 340 U.S. 211 (1951). 
17. 340 U.S. at 213 (emphasis added). 
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fact have been presumed to reduce wholesaler compet1t1on, it is 
significant that the Court chose to focus on the restriction on the use 
of a competitive tool instead of the restricted competition itself. 
There are other cases that demonstrate the Court's concern with 
the freedom of individual traders to compete. In Apex Hosiery, the 
Supreme Court stated that a restrictive practice is not unlawful "un-
less the restraint is shown to have or is intended to have an effect 
upon prices in the market or otherwise to deprive purchasers or 
consumers of the advantages which they derive from free competi-
tion."18 This passage apparently limits finding a restraint unlawful 
to those situations in which the restraint produced the kind of in-
jurious effects upon the price level usually associated with a lessening 
of competition. The Apex Hosiery decision was in fact so interpreted 
by the Ninth Circuit in Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores) Inc.19 
However, on appeal the Supreme Court specifically rejected an inter-
pretation of Apex Hosiery which would require a showing of effect 
on market prices in order to find an unreasonable restraint.20 Revers-
ing the decision of the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court held that a 
complaint charging manufacturers and distributors with a concerted 
refusal to deal with plaintiff-an appliance dealer-did allege an 
unlawful restraint of trade in spite of the fact that the elimination 
of plaintiff from the retail market would not have resulted in an 
injury to the public through lessened competition.21 The attempt 
to eliminate a single competitor was found to violate the Sherman 
Act even though the victim was "just one merchant whose business 
is so small that his destruction makes little difference to the econ-
omy. "22 As in Keifer-Stewart, the Court emphasized the effects of 
the restraint on individual traders: "This combination takes from 
K.lor's its freedom to buy appliances in an open competitive market 
and drives it out of business as a dealer in the defendant's products. 
It deprives the manufacturers and distributors of their freedom to 
sell to Klor's .... "23 
Both Klor's and Keifer-Stewart are distinguishable from the 
S & H case because they involved per se offenses.24 Thus, neither 
18. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 501 (1940). 
19. 255 F.2d 214, 235 (9th Cir. 1958), rev'd, 359 U.S. 207 (1959). 
20. Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959). 
21. It was shown at the trial that Klor's was only one of hundreds of retail competi-
tors in the market area, and that competition would not have been diminished by the 
elimination of one dealer. 359 U.S. at 209-10. 
22. 359 U.S. at 213. 
23. 359 U.S. at 213. Quoting from its opinion in Keifer-Stewart, the Court found 
that defendant's actions tended to "cripple the freedom of traders and thereby restrain 
their ability to sell in accordance with their own judgement." 359 U.S. at 212. See text 
accompanying note 17 supra. 
24. Rahl, Per Se Rules and Boycotts Under the Sherman Act: Some Reflections on 
the Klor's Case, 45 VA. L. R.Ev. 1165 (1959); Recent Decision, Antitrust Laws-Concerted 
Refusals To Deal-Public Injury, 57 MICH. L. R.Ev. 1244 (1959). 
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holding was necessarily based solely upon the finding that the trader's 
independent judgment was restrained. However, the cases do demon-
strate an increasing concern for the protection of the individual 
trader's ability to select his methods of competition unencumbered 
by agreements with other traders who seek to restrain his choice.25 
Thus, it is submitted that a sounder basis for the FTC decision 
condemning S & H's one-for-ten policy as an unfair trade practice 
would have been a holding that significant restraints upon an indi-
vidual retailer's freedom to employ important competitive tools 
violate section 5 whether or not they in fact tend to lessen competi-
tion. 
This rationale would also focus attention on factual considera-
tions such as the seriousness of the restraint and the possible justifica-
tions for imposing it. It is clear that not every restraint upon a trad-
er's freedom to use a competitive tool should be attacked as an unfair 
trade practice. In determining whether a restraint is unreasonable 
the Commission and the courts should examine the extent to which 
retailers are foreclosed from using a competitive tool, the importance 
of the particular tool to a retailer or group of retailers, and whether 
the restraint is reasonably necessary to protect a legitimate business 
interest of the company imposing it. 
In the Sperry &- Hutchinson Co. case, the company sought to 
eliminate completely the use of multiple stamping by its licensed 
dealers. The restraint is substantial because multiple stamping, where 
it has been allowed, has proved to be an attractive and effective mode 
of competition.26 As the FTC observed, the effectiveness of multiple 
stamping is apparent from the complaints from S & H licensees to 
the company about competing licensees who disregard the one-for-
ten agreement.27 
The legitimate business interests of S & H,28 of course, must be 
weighed against this restraint on the retailer. The stamp company 
claimed that the one-for-ten policy was necessary to define its 
25. There are several other decisions which reflect the Supreme Court's solicitude 
for the freedom of the trader or, on a broader scale, its devotion to the preservation 
of small businessmen. The Court has condemned tying arrangements as a means by 
which a "seller coerces the abdication of the buyer's independent judgment as to the 
'tied' product's merits .••. " Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 
605 (1953). The element of imposition upon the retailer in these arrangements was 
also noted in United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962). 
In Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964), the Court was particularly con-
cerned with the coercive aspects of a resale price maintenance program which de-
prived dealers of "[p]ractically the only power they have to be wholly independent 
businessmen •.• .'' 377 U.S. at 20, 21. See also United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 
U.S. 270 (1966); Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357 (1965); Brown Shoe Co. v. 
United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). For a general discussion of this phenomenon see 
T. Kauper, The "Warren Court" and the Antitrust Laws: Of Economics, Populism, 
and Cynicism, 67 MICH. L. REv. 325, 330, 332-34 (1968). 
26. Principal case at 20,779-82. 
27. Principal case at 20,783-85. 
28. See note 5 supra. 
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services to the customer. This presumably means that customers are 
thought to be less attracted to stores distributing S & H stamps when 
they are not assured of receiving one stamp for every ten-cent pur-
chase. However, since multiple stamping results in more stamps 
being given to the customer, removing the one-for-ten restriction 
could only increase the attractiveness of the S & H stamp. 
S & H also claimed a need to provide a rate of issuance which 
would be profitable to its licensees and to protect them from the in-
juries of multiple stamping by competing licensees. The most likely 
injury to retailers from multiple stamping stems from the use of 
stamps in multiple stamp wars. The 1953 supermarket stamp war 
in Denver showed that multiple stamp competition can be as intense 
and difficult to end as ordinary price wars.29 By maintaining the one-
for-ten restriction on its own dealers and cooperating with other 
stamp companies which have similar policies,30 S & H can offer its 
stamp plan to retailers with the assurance that they will not become 
engaged in multiple stamp competition. The result, as the Supreme 
Court has described it, is that "[t]he product then comes packaged 
in a competition-free wrapping-a valuable feature in itself-by 
virtue of concerted action induced by the manufacturer."31 Thus, it 
seems that S & H's objective of protecting its licensees from multiple-
stamp competition tends to condemn rather than justify the one-for-
ten policy.32 It is possible, however, that, despite the example of the 
Denver stamp war, multiple stamping will generally be a more 
limited and safer form of competition-from the retailer's point of 
view-than price reductions. As suggested above, in such a situation 
retailers may forgo price competition in order to use a competitive 
method which requires fewer concessions to the consumer; if this 
29. Hammer, Will Trading Stamps Stick?, FORTUNE, Aug. 1960, at ll6. 
30. The FTC found that S &: H, in addition to maintaining its own one-for-ten 
policy, had cooperated with other stamp companies in imposing the policy upon their 
respective licensees. Although this cooperative action raises the possibility of a hori-
zontal restraint of trade by competing stamp companies, the FTC treated the inter-
company actions as part of the vertical restraint which S &: H had placed upon its 
licensees. Principal case at 20,785-86. 
31. United States v. Parke, Davis &: Co., 362 U.S. 29, 47 (1960). The FTC analogized 
the relationship of S &: H to its licensed dealers to practices involved in cases dealing 
with resale price maintenance and price maintenance combinations. Principal case at 
20,783 [citing Parke, Davis, FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922); Dr. 
Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Parke &: Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911)]. It stated that 
situations in which S &: H contacted multiple-stamping retailers at the behest of com-
peting retailers were not necessary to prove restraint of trade under count 1 of the 
complaint, but that they were important to illustrate that the restrictive "agreements 
were more than a mere formality." The FTC then stated that this was "close to a 
horizontal combination among retailers." Principal case at 20,784. 
32. The FTC so found. Principal case at 20,785, where the Commission stated that 
the facts involving S &: H "have gone far beyond the bounds proscribed by the Su-
preme Court of a mere announcement of policy and a refusal to deal," an obvious 
reference to the Colgate doctrine, U.S. v. Colgate &: Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919) and its 
treatment in cases like Parke, Davis and Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968). 
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was in fact the case, S & H's restraints on multiple stamping might be 
justifiable. 
However, S & H has not shown that multiple stamping limits 
competition or that restraints upon multiple stamping will produce 
a return to price competition. Retailers who are denied the use of 
multiple stamping may simply employ other forms of nonprice com-
petition-for instance, games or free gifts with purchases. The retail 
gasoline market offers an example of this behavior. Since S & H 
supplies stamps to a variety of retail markets where competitors 
may use stamps in a variety of ways, it may be impossible to deter-
mine with any degree of certainty what effect multiple stamping has 
upon total competitive activity. In the absence of any concrete evi-
dence on the question, it certainly seems that any doubt should be 
resolved in favor of removing restraints upon retailers' freedom to 
choose their own methods of competition. Therefore, if the trader's 
freedom to choose his competitive tools can be protected in its own 
right under section 5, the S & H one-for-ten policy, regardless of its 
competitive effects, is clearly an unfair trade practice.33 
As noted at the outset, the FTC also attacked the legality of 
S & H's suppression of two forms of stamp redemption. The first 
type of redemption activity is carried on by stamp exchanges that 
buy, sell, and arrange the trading of collector's stamps on a com-
mission basis. The second type is a form of sales promotion in which 
retailers offer to redeem the stamps which their customers have pre-
viously collected at other stores. Some of these retailers offer their 
ovm variety of stamp in exchange for whatever stamps the customer 
has collected and others accept stamps in payment for merchandise. 
S & H effectively suppressed much of the exchange and retailer re-
demption by obtaining injunctions; in many instances, redemption 
was suppressed simply by threatening to seek such injunctions. 
The problem of unauthorized stamp redemption activity (from 
S & H's viewpoint) has been considered many times by various courts 
in the suits by S & H to obtain injunctions against these forms of 
redemption. Most of these courts34 granted injunctions on the 
grounds that such redemption was injurious to the legitimate busi-
ness interests of S & H, that the use being made of S & H stamps was 
inconsistent with the limited purpose for which they were issued, 
and that in so using them the redeemers were appropriating some-
thing of value from the stamp company and its licensees. It was also 
33. Under this view Commissioner Jones is clearly correct in suggesting in her 
dissenting statement that the S &: H restraint upon the minimum number of stamps 
issued should also be prohibited. The fixing of minimum and maximum rates are 
equally restrictive of the trader's freedom to use a competitive weapon as he sees fit. 
Principal case at 20,794-95. See also Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968). 
34. E.g., Sperry &: Hutchinson Co. v. Fenster, 219 F. 755 (D.C.N.Y. 1915); Sperry &: 
Hutchinson Co. v. Temple, 137 F. 992 (C.D. Mass. 1905); State ex rel. Richman v. Sperry 
&: Hutchinson Co., 56 N.J. Super. 589, 153 A.2d 691 (1959). 
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held that the S & H restrictions on the use of its stamps did not 
violate a state antitrust law prohibiting acts, combinations, contracts, 
and conspiracies in restraint of trade or commerce. 85 
When this practice came before the FTC for the first time in the 
principal case, the Commission argued that suppression of stamp 
redemption by S & H constituted an unlawful restraint upon aliena-
tion. The FTC noted that if the S & H policy were such an unlawful 
restraint it might be a per se offense under section I of the Sherman 
Act.86 The Commission declined to base its holding on that ground, 
but it did consider the problem of whether S & H had retained title 
to the stamps. It found that although S & H gives notice in each 
collector's book that title to the stamps is retained by the company, 
the company retains none of the risks of ownership such as the duty 
to replace lost stamps or pay a tax on stamps in the hands of its 
licensees. The Commission concluded that "the evidence is not 
sufficient to demonstrate that [S & H] has exercised dominion over 
the stamps. "87 
Other courts have, however, found that S & H does retain an 
interest in the stamps sufficient to warrant placing restraints upon 
their use.38 In 1908, a federal circuit court stated that S & H's "stamps 
are not, in the full sense, property. Their nontransferability is an 
essential element of their value, both to complainant [S & H] and its 
subscribers."89 In this case and others like it, the stamp is not con-
sidered as physical property over which the company may or may 
not have retained dominion. Rather, it is viewed as a token of certain 
rights which the customer receives. In Sperry b Hutchinson Co. v. 
Mechanics' Clothing Co.,40 another early federal case, it was held 
that the rights of the customer are limited to those which are ex-
pressly or impliedly promised him by the company. Thus, while the 
stamp "may be transferred in any way which confines its use within 
the purpose for which it was issued, it may not be transferred in 
such a way as to destroy its value as an instrument of special trade 
advantage . . . ."41 
35. Rance v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 410. P.2d 859 (Okla.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 
945 (1965). 
36. The Commission cited United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 
(1967), for the proposition that unlawful restraints on alienation may be per se viola-
tions of section l of the Sherman Act. However, it noted that the circumstances of the 
trading stamp scheme might be distinguishable from the situation where products are 
transferred to dealers for resale. 
37. Principal case at 20,790. 
38. E.g., Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Mechanics' Clothing Co., 135 F. 833 (C.C.D. 
R.I., 1904); State ex rel. Richman v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 56 N.J. Super. 589, 153 
A.2d 691 (1959); Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Siegal, Cooper & Co., 309 Ill. 193, 140 N.E. 
834 (1923). 
39. Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Louis Weber & Co., 161 F. 219, 221 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 
1908). 
40. 135 F. 833 (C.C.D. R.I. 1904). 
41. 135 F. at 836. 
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Under this early rationale, a limitation upon the transfer of 
stamps is a limitation upon the rights given to the customer by the 
stamp company rather than a restraint upon the customer's ability to 
transfer his property. The trading stamp is, as one judge observed, 
"sui generis,"42 and for this reason the courts and the FTC are 
probably correct in refusing to apply the ancient property concept of 
improper restraint upon alienation to the stamp situation. 
The FTC found that the S & H policy of suppressing stamp 
redemption was an unfair trade practice because the policy had 
severe anticompetitive effects upon exchange operators and retailers 
who used stamp redemption. S & H again attempted to justify this 
policy on the grounds of business necessity, but the FTC found that 
the company had failed to show any injury to its business resulting 
from the unauthorized redemption activities. The opinion noted 
that since most stamp exchanges had been quickly suppressed there 
was very little evidence about what effect they might have had, but 
the Commission concluded that commercial exchanges were unlikely 
to have any greater effect than the informal exchanges among house-
wives presently allowed by S & H.43 
The FTC finding that the stamp company does not suffer in-
jury if it allows the exchange activity is unique. Previously, state 
and federal courts found that such redemption activity does 
harm the stamp companies.44 The rationale of the trading stamp 
scheme is that once the purchaser has begun to collect a certain 
stamp, he becomes "locked in" and will return to the store issuing 
that stamp until he has collected enough stamps for redemption.45 
One advantage to a retailer of associating with S & H, which issues 
between thirty-seven and forty per cent of all trading stamps circu-
lated in this country, is that more people are locked in to the S & H 
green stamp. The stamp exchanges, where consumers can trade their 
S & H stamps for another kind (or vice versa), enable the purchaser 
to switch stores in response to factors of convenience or considera-
42. 135 F. at 834. 
43. The FTC noted that in 1960 twenty per cent of the stamps issued were ex-
changed by housewives on an informal basis. The Commission also cited S &: H's policy 
of encouraging the pooling of stamps for charitable purposes as an instance in which 
the necessity to complete books is not an element in inducing the consumer to pa-
tronize S &: H licensees. Principal case at 20,789. 
44. As one court stated the problem, "to create an unfair market for partly filled 
and nontransferable stamp books would have the tendency to keep purchasers from 
trading with subscribers until they were filled.'' Sperry &: Hutchinson Co. v. Louis 
Weber &: Co., 161 F. 219, 221 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1908). Also, "the function of the stamp as 
a symbol is not merely to induce a single purchase of the retailer's offering, but to 
provide an incentive for continued patronage." State by Richman v. Sperry &: Hutch-
inson Co., 56 N.J. Super. 589, 603, 153 A.2d 691, 699 (1959). 
45. The creation of "families" of stamp stores in each market area incorporates 
the same idea. The purchaser who is collecting one type of stamp at his supermarket 
will presumably patronize other local businesses-gas stations, stationers, and so forth 
-issuing the same stamp. 
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tions of price and quality. This increased mobility does not come at 
the expense of losing the value of a consumer's partly filled books as 
long as stamp exchanges operate. Of course, the interchangeability 
of stamps eliminates the necessity of returning to a store dispensing 
S & H stamps; the retailer loses the long-term drawing power of his 
stamp scheme, and consequently the stamp company will probably 
lose some retailers as customers. Since this loss to the company is a 
logical result of the redemption activity, the FTC finding that S & H 
was not injured is suspect. 
The Commission stated that even if S & H did have good business 
reasons for its suppressive policy, such reasons would have to be 
weighed against the policy's anticompetitive effects on exchange 
operators and competing retailers. Finding that there was no injury 
to S & H enabled the FTC to avoid the necessity of weighing the 
company's business needs. Assuming, however, that a stamp company 
could demonstrate injury to its business along the lines suggested 
above, it is submitted that a balancing of the business justifications 
and the anticompetitive effects of suppressing redemption should 
result in a finding that the S & H policy is an unfair trade practice 
only with regard to independent retailer redemption. In light of the 
potential injuries to a major stamp company, the two types of redemp-
tion activity do not warrant the same protection under section 5. 
The trading stamp exchange might be likened to the second-hand 
market situations involved in Butternick Publishing Co. v. FTC46 
and United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.41 In Butternick, 
a group of magazine publishers had attempted to suppress the 
second-hand sale of their publications by concerted refusals to deal 
with retailers who marketed the second-hand copies. The Second 
Circuit held that this was a violation of section 5, basing its decision 
in part on a finding that the publishers' actions restrained the pur-
chasers' right to resell the magazines. But the decision was also based 
on a finding that the new and used copies of a particular issue com-
pete with each other in the retail magazine market and that the sup-
pression of second-hand sales necessarily restrained this competition. 
Similarly, in United Shoe Machinery Corp., a federal district court 
in Massachusetts held that the manufacturing company's refusal to 
sell its machines in addition to leasing them prevented the crea-
tion of a second-hand market that could have competed with the 
company in supplying machines to shoe manufacturers. 
The trading stamp exchange is similar to a second-hand market in 
that both activities are totally dependent upon the products of 
another business, but they differ in other, more important aspects. 
Unlike the second-hand dealer and the primary producer, the stamp 
46. 85 F.2d 522 (2d Cir. 1936). 
47. 110 F. Supp. 295 (D.C. Mass. 1953), afj'd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). 
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exchange and the stamp company do not compete directly: the ex-
change does not compete with the company in the sale of stamps to 
retailers, nor does it compete in the redemption of stamps for goods, 
since the trading stamps which are bought and sold by the exchange 
must still be redeemed by the trading stamp companies. Accordingly, 
neither the number of stamps received by the customer nor the 
quality of goods offered by the stamp company is enhanced by the 
existence of the exchanges. Thus, one justification for protecting 
a second-hand market-that such a market provides meaningful 
competition to the original producer or issuer-is inapplicable to 
the stamp exchanges, which produce none of the benefits associated 
with the second-hand markets in Butternick and United Shoe.48 
Moreover, no competitive response by the company can counter-
act the exchange's destructive effects on the stamp scheme. Regard-
less of how many stamps are issued or what kind of stamps are used, 
the long-term drawing power of the scheme will still be reduced if 
the customer knows that he can trade in his disparate stamps at the 
exchange. But there is a serious question whether this drawing power 
should be protected at all. Since the "lock-in" feature of trading 
stamps tends to bring the consumer back to a certain store for reasons 
unrelated to price or product quality, the scheme may tend to fore-
close competing retailers from access to the consumer saving the 
stamps of another store, thus inhibiting retailer competition for such 
a consumer. Still, if the stamp scheme is-as the Federal Trade Com-
mission found-a competitive tool worth preserving, the stamp com-
pany should be allowed to protect the drawing power of its stamps 
against the destructive effects of the stamp exchanges so long as the 
means used are not in themselves unlawful. 
The competitive effects of stamp redemption by competing 
retailers are essentially different from those resulting from the stamp 
exchanges. The retailer who redeems his competitor's stamps is using 
stamp redemption as a means of competition. New stamp companies 
and their licensees can employ this method to win acceptance for 
their stamp, and nonstamp retailers may use it to lure customers from 
stamp-giving stores. Although retailer redemption may alter the use 
of trading stamps, it does so in the process of competition. Unlike 
the stamp exchanges, redemption by competing dealers may produce 
beneficial competitive responses. The threat of competition from a 
new stamp may evoke efforts to make the old ones more attractive. 
48. The stamp exchange does benefit the stamp collector at least temporarily by 
allowing him to choose from all the companies' goods when redeeming his stamps. 
However, the advantage of this choice may be offset by a general reduction in the 
quality of goods offered by all the companies. The fact that a collector can obtain a 
stamp company's redemption goods without patronizing its retailers reduces the in-
centive of the stamp companies to compete in the quality of goods they offer. Further-
more, the collector's expanded choice of redemption goods is of obviously limited value 
if the exchanges are sufficiently harmful to eliminate the stamp schemes altogether. 
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Unrestricted stamp redemption by some dealers may be met with 
similar action by other dealers. Thus, restraint of retailer redemption 
has detrimental effects on competition which may outweigh the 
damage that it does to the stamp companies and their licensees. The 
antitrust laws do not protect businessmen from the effects of legiti-
mate competition, nor do they allow them to protect themselves by 
restraining that competition. Therefore, the FTC was correct in 
finding that the S & H policy of suppressing retailer redemption is 
an unfair trade practice which restrains an effective and generally 
beneficial method of competition. 
